Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road to Tufts by Halliday, Susan M. & Manno, Theodore P.
South Carolina Law Review 
Volume 36 Issue 3 Article 4 
Spring 1985 
Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road to 
Tufts 
Susan M. Halliday 
Exxon Corporation (New York, NY) 
Theodore P. Manno 
Exxon Corporation (New York, NY) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Susan Marie Halliday & Theodore Paul Manno, Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road 
to Tufts, 36 S. C. L. Rev. 403 (1985). 
This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
DEATH OF A FOOTNOTE: A CURRENT
VIEW OF CRANE AND THE ROAD TO
TUFTS
SUSAN MARIE HALLIDAY* AND THEODORE PAUL MANNO**
L INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court, after a generation of uncertainty, set-
tled in 1983 an issue of great importance to taxpayers utilizing
nonrecourse financing in tax shelters and other investments.1
The Court, in Commissioner v. Tufts,2 held that the Commis-
sioner may properly require a taxpayer to include the full
amount of an unpaid nonrecourse loan in amount realized for
purposes of calculating gain or loss on property sold subject to
such a debt. The decision requires a taxpayer .to include the un-
paid debt in amount realized regardless of whether the unpaid
amount exceeds the fair market value of the property sold. The
Justices' decision in Tufts reversed a widely debated decision of
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 3 and eliminated the uncer-
tainty created thirty-six years earlier by "the most famous foot-
note in the tax law."
'4
* B.A., Webster College, 1970; J.D., Hofstra University, 1974. Member of the New
York Bar. Counsel, Exxon Corporation, New York, New York.
** B.A., New York University, 1967; M.A., New York University, 1970; J.D., Ford-
ham University, 1974. Member of the New York Bar. Associate Director of Advanced
Planning Services, Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company, Newark, New Jersey.
The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors.
1. Under nonrecourse financing, a creditor can reach only the property which
secures the note. The creditor cannot reach the debtor's other assets. See infra note 17
and accompanying text.
2. 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
3. Tufts v. Comm'r, 651 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 461 U.S. 300 (1983).
4. Mankoff, Supreme Court's Tufts Decision-Is "Market Value" Still Critical?, 1
J. TAX'N OF INV. 77, 77 (1983). Accord Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the
Crane Case, 33 TAx L. REV. 277 (1978); Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's
Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575, 575 (1981). See generally Sanders, Sup. Ct., end-
ing Crane controversy, says nonrecourse debt is always part of sales price, 59 J. TAX'N 2
(1983); Bertha, Tufts and Tax Shelters, 62 TAXEs 28 (1984); Case Comment, Some Re-
flections on Commissioner v. Tufts: Mrs. Crane Shops at Kirby Lumber, 35 RUTGERS L.
REV. 929 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Rutgers Note]; Note, Crane's Footnote 37 Laid to
1
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That footnote, footnote thirty-seven to Crane v. Commis-
sioner,5 suggested that, when nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair
market value of the property sold subject to that debt, the fair
market value of the property limits the amount a taxpayer must
take into account in reporting gain or loss for federal income tax
purposes.6 The value of the tax shelter property at issue in Tufts
declined after its purchase, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals accepted the limitation suggested by Crane footnote
thirty-seven. As a result, the Fifth Circuit allowed the taxpayers
to claim a capital loss from the sale of the property, when the
taxpayers had already enjoyed other tax benefits from owning
the shelter property.7 The Supreme Court's rejection of the foot-
note thirty-seven limitation and consequent reversal increased
the amount realized by the taxpayer from the sale of the prop-
erty. The resulting capital gain charge significantly and ad-
versely altered the tax treatment of the taxpayer-investor who
had disposed of the shelter property."
This Article discusses the historical development of the
"footnote thirty-seven problem" and analyzes the Court's rejec-
tion of the limitation suggested in Crane's footnote thirty-seven.
The Article also reviews the recent efforts by the legislative
branch of the federal government, in the Tax Acts of 1982 and
1984,1 to reduce the desirability of certain tax shelter practices.
This Article concludes that Tufts is not a judicial attack on tax
shelters similar to these legislative efforts, but is rather a prod-
Rest, 49 Mo. L. REV. 372 (1984); Landey, STOP the Discussion of Tufts: The Principles
Are the Same When Transferring Encumbered Property by Gift, 62 TAXEs 652 (1984);
Comment, Commissioner v. Tufts: A Sound Decision, 61 DEN. L.J. 93 (1983); Note, 33
DRAKE L. REV. 443 (1984); Miller, The Supreme Court Does It Again in Tufts: Right
Answer, Wrong Reason, 11 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 3 (1983); Jacobs & Bennett, Real Estate
Shelters and the Tufts Case, CLU KEEPING CURRENT, March 1984, at 88; Seago, Disposi-
tions of Real Property Subject to Nonrecourse Debts After Tufts, 14 TAX ADVISER 587
(1983); Note, An Answer to Crane's Footnote 37: Commissioner v. Tufts, 37 TAX LAW.
409 (1984); Comment, Determination of Gain-Crane's Footnote 37 Is Laid to Rest, 5
WmwwIER L. REV. 709 (1983); Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949 (1983).
5. 331 U.S. 1 (1947). See generally Adams, Exploring the Outer Boundaries of the
Crane Doctrine; An Imaginary Supreme Court Opinion, 21 TAX L. REV. 159 (1966); Del
Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current View of Some Tax Effects
in Mortgage Financing, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 69 (1969); Bittker, supra note 4, at 277.
6. 331 U.S. at 14 n.37. See infra text accompanying note 56.
7. See infra notes 95, 113 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 151-88 and accompanying text.
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DEATH OF A FOOTNOTE
uct of the Supreme Court's adherence to stare decisis, and is an
illustration of the symmetrical treatment of nonrecourse debt
the Court envisioned in Crane.10
II. Crane v. Commissioner
The taxpayer in Crane was a widow who inherited a build-
ing from her husband in 1932. The property's fair market value
at the time of the husband's death was $262,042.50, and the
property was encumbered by nonrecourse debt in the same
amount. After operating the building for several years, Mrs.
Crane sold it, subject to the debt, for $3,000, and incurred $500
in selling expenses. At the time of the sale, the principal amount
of the debt was $255,000."
The Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) provides that gain
equals amount realized less adjusted basis.' 2 "Gain," "amount
realized," and "adjusted basis" are terms of art under the Code.
In ordinary usage the term "to realize" means "to convert into
money," but the tax significance of the term is broader. For tax
purposes, "to realize" means the "conversion of property into
money, other property, or other economic benefit cognizable for
tax purposes."'13 The starting point for calculating basis of in-
herited property is I.R.C. section 1014 (which at the time of
Crane was section 113(a)(5)). Section 1014 provides that a tax-
payer who acquires property from a decedent takes as his basis
the value of the property as stated on the decedent's federal es-
tate tax return.' 4 In Crane, the taxpayer asserted that a further
10. See infra notes 192-97 and accompanying text. See Note, Federal Income Tax
Treatment of Nonrecourse Debt, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1498, 1525-30 (1982)[hereinafter
cited as Columbia Note] for the view that the Crane rationale does not provide the sym-
metry the decision purportedly assures.
11. 331 U.S. at 3.
12. I.R.C. § 1001 (1984). In 1947, the year that Crane was decided, the Internal
Revenue Code contained the same equation used to calculate gain. Revenue Act of 1938,
Pub. L. No. 554, § 111, 52 Stat. 484, 485 (1938)[hereinafter cited as Revenue Act].
13. Kaney, Federal Income Taxation of Exchanges in Partition of Commonly
Owned Property: Realization vs. Realism, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 629, 634 (1980)(emphasis
added).
14. Revenue Act, supra note 12, § 113(a)(5) contained the same principle as is con-
tained in I.R.C. § 1014 (1984). The rule itself can constitute a tax shelter (albeit one that
requires from a taxpayer the ultimate sacrifice). The rule allows a taxpayer and his heirs
to entirely avoid income tax on the capital appreciation of property to the time of the
taxpayer's death. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 would have changed this "step-up" rule
1985]
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step in the calculation of basis was necessary, namely, subtrac-
tion of the amount of debt secured by the property. Consistent
with this assertion, the taxpayer claimed that her original basis
in the building was her net equity in it at the time of acquisi-
tion. The taxpayer calculated her net equity by subtracting the
amount of the debt encumbering the property from its fair mar-
ket value. Under the circumstances, the taxpayer's net equity
was zero because the fair market value equaled the debt at the
time of her acquisition; she therefore used zero as her adjusted
basis. The taxpayer then calculated amount realized as $2,500
by subtracting her selling expenses of $500 from the $3,000 she
received for the encumbered property. Accordingly, the taxpayer
reported a gain of $2,500 by subtracting her adjusted basis of
zero from the amount realized of $2,500.5 The Supreme Court
with a provision for a carry-over basis at death. The Revenue Act of 1978 postponed this
change, and a provision in the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 finally aban-
doned it. See Pub. L. No. 96-223, § 401(a), 94 Stat. 229, 299 (1980); Pub. L. No. 95-600, §
702(c), 92 Stat. 2763, 2925-28 (1978); Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2005, 90 Stat. 1520, 1872
(1976). With respect to decedents dying after December 31, 1976, and before November
7, 1978, the repeal permitted a taxpayer to elect whether to use the carry-over basis rules
in lieu of the step-up. Congress also made a limited provision for the use of carry-over
basis in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 [hereinafter referred to as ERTA] in
order to combat anticipated abuse of the step-up. Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 425, 95 Stat. 172,
318 (1981); STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIc RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 at 264-65 (C.I.R. Print 1981).
Because ERTA increased the amount of the unified credit available against estate and
gift taxes, and provided an unlimited marital deduction, the following would have been
possible after the Act: a family member with low basis property could have given it to a
relative who had a terminal illness, who anticipated little or no estate tax liability, and
who had previously or simultaneously executed a will bequeathing such property to the
donor. At the donee's death the original owner would have gotten his property back, and
his ownership of it would have been purged of any possibility of capital gains taxation on
the appreciation to that date. The House of Representatives' version of ERTA would
have discouraged this strategy by denying a stepped-up basis in appreciated property
received by a decedent within three years of his death, if the property passed at his
death directly or indirectly to the original donor or the donor's spouse. The prohibition
in its final form applies only to gifts to a decedent within one year before death. I.R.C. §
1014(e)(1984). The 1984 Act also prevents a "free" step-up by denying use of the alter-
nate valuation date unless the gross estate and the tax are thereby increased. Tax Re-
form Act of 1984, Pub, L. No. 98-369, § 1023, 98 Stat. 494, 1030 (amending I.R.C. § 2032
(1984)),
15. 331 U.S. at 3-4. The taxpayer reported 50% of the gain as taxable pursuant to
then I.R.C. § 117. See Columbia Note, supra note 10, at 1499, noted in Tufts, 461 U.S. at
308 n.5; see infra notes 103-09 and accompanying text for the view that "basis should
reflect the taxpayer's equity in property, so that nonrecourse debt is not included in
basis." See also Pietrovito, Tufts v. Commissioner, A Limitation on the Inclusion of
Non-recourse Liabilities in Amount Realized, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 265 (1982).
4
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rejected the taxpayer's use of net equity as adjusted basis and
established that (1) the basis of property for purposes of calcu-
lating gain or loss and depreciation includes any debt incurred
in its purchase or receipt, and (2) the amount realized on the
sale of property includes relief from any debt encumbering it.
16
The Court thus established a symmetrical treatment of debt by
mandating that a taxpayer include it in the calculation of both
adjusted basis and amount realized.
The Court in Crane treated recourse and nonrecourse debt
identically in this respect, despite the disparity of the economic
consequences each produces. Recourse debt involves a debtor
who is personally liable. A creditor who is a party to recourse
debt can reach the property securing the note as well as the
debtor's other assets. On the other hand, nonrecourse debt in-
volves a debtor who is not personally liable. A creditor who is a
party to nonrecourse debt can reach only the property securing
the debt.17 Despite this distinction in types of debt, the Court
reasoned that because the value of the property involved in
Crane was at least equal to the outstanding mortgage at the
time of sale, the taxpayer had an economic incentive to dis-
charge the debt so as to protect her investment.18 In other
words, although the debt in Crane was nonrecourse and the tax-
payer was therefore not personally liable, she would behave in
the same manner as if she were liable because she would receive,
by paying off the encumbrance, property worth at least the
amount she would expend in so doing.
The Court therefore ruled that the taxpayer's original basis
fully included the original amount of the debt. The Court fur-
ther held that the taxpayer's amount realized included both the
$2,500 in hand and an amount equal to the discharge of the bal-
ance of the $255,000 debt. Thus, the Court found that the tax-
16. 331 U.S. at 13. See, e.g., Millar v. Comm'r, 577 F.2d 212, 214 (3d Cir. 1978);
Adams, supra note 5, at 159; Comment, Non-Recourse Liability: A Tax Shelter, 29 BAY-
LOR L. REV. 57, 63 (1977).
17. For judicial discussion of the differences between the types of debt, see Genessee
Trustee Corp. v. Smith, 102 F.2d 125, 127 (6th Cir. 1939); Evans v. First Nat'l Bank, 138
Neb. 727, 735, 297 N.W. 154, 158-59 (1940); Grover v. Gratiot Macomb Dev. Co., 257
Mich. 26, 29, 240 N.W. 66, 67 (1932).
18. 331 U.S. at 14. See infra notes 34-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the tax consequences when the amount of the debt is so excessive that the taxpayer does
not have this incentive.
1985]
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payer's amount realized was $257,500.1' Although not necessary
to the decision, the Court suggested in footnote thirty-seven
that, had the debt exceeded the property's fair market value at
the time of the sale, the fair market value might have limited
the amount of the debt the taxpayer was required to include in
amount realized. Footnote thirty-seven and including debt in
amount realized troubled tax practitioners for thirty-six years.
This uncertainty precipitated the Tufts decision.
A. The Crane Basis Rule
The basis calculation Crane requires is favorable to taxpay-
ers. It is the "foundation stone of most tax shelters '20 because it
results in a tax basis for depreciation and other deductions in an
amount exceeding, and sometimes far exceeding, cash outlays
and the amount of an investor's personal liability.2 Commenta-
tors suggested that courts should reexamine this basis ("front-
end") calculation, rather than the amount realized ("back-end")
calculation,22 citing a concurring opinion in a First Circuit case
as support.23 The recent legislative attacks on tax shelters found
in the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and the
Tax Reform Act of 1984,24 have not altered the rule in Crane
that a taxpayer must include nonrecourse debt in the basis of
property for purposes of calculating depreciation and gain or
19. 331 U.S. at 11-14.
20. Bittker, supra note 4, at 283, cited in Comm'r v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 309 n.7
(1983). See also Sanders, supra note 4, at 2; Technical Notes and Comments, Inflated
Basis of Tax Shelters Attacked by I.R.S., 6 TAx'N FOR LAW. 14 (1977).
21. See supra sources cited in note 20. A tax shelter is an investment, a significant
feature of which is the production of either: (a) deductions, exceeding the income pro-
duced by the investment, which are available to offset other income; or (b) tax credits,
exceeding the tax on the investment, which are available to offset other taxes. See Treas.
Reg. § 10.33(c)(2)(1984). This tax shelter definition derives from that appearing in Treas.
Circular 230, which concerns the rendering of tax shelter opinions. See generally Final
Treas. Regs., 25 TAX. MGMT. MEMO (BNA) 147, 149 (1984); Goldfein and Cohn, Final
Circular 230 Amendments Prescribe Disciplinary Standards for Shelter Opinions, 60 J.
TAX'N 330 (1984).
22. See generally Columbia Note, supra note 10.
23. Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459-60 (1st Cir. 1950)(Magruder, C.J.,
concurring).
24. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat.
324 (1982)(codified as amended in sections of Title 26 of U.S.C.); Tax Reform Act of




South arolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/4
1985] DEATH OF A FOOTNOTE
loss.
The application of Crane's basis principles, however, is lim-
ited.2 5 With respect to investments other than those in real
property involving nonrecourse debt, the I.R.C. section 465 "at
risk" rules may limit the amount of deductions without affecting
basis.2" Moreover, with respect to both real and personal prop-
25. The basis reduction required upon electing the full investment tax credit is not a
function of nonrecourse financing. It applies even when recourse debt or cash constitutes
all or part of the purchase price. Prior to the passage of the Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act of 1982 [hereinafter referred to as TEFRA], the calculation of allowa-
ble depreciation deductions was independent of investment tax credit allowable with re-
spect to the property depreciated. TEFRA, however, requires that a taxpayer who re-
ceives the investment tax credit for eligible property placed in service on or after
January 1, 1983, must reduce his basis for determining depreciation and gain or loss by
fifty percent of the credit taken, unless he elects to reduce the credit otherwise allowed
by two percentage points. I.R.C. § 48(q)(1) & (4)(B)(ii)(1984). For example, a taxpayer
who purchases "5-year property" for $12,000 and who could normally claim a 10% in-
vestment tax credit must either reduce his basis to $11,400 and take a full $1,200 credit
(10% of $12,000), or maintain a $12,000 basis and take a $960 credit (8% of $12,000).
I.R.C. § 168(c)(2)(B)(1984). The availability of this option, an option to expense up to
$5,000 of certain tangible depreciable property under I.R.C. § 179(a) and (d)(1)(1984),
and an option to use straight-line depreciation under I.R.C. § 168(b)(3)(1984) instead of
the accelerated cost recovery system statutory percentage, allow a taxpayer flexibility in
choosing whether to take "up front" tax benefits or later deductions.
At least two provisions of the 1984 Tax Reform Act would affect this choice. Section
13 of Subtitle A, "Deferral of Certain Tax Deductions," amends § 179(b)(1) and freezes
the expensing limit at $5,000 through 1987. The section postpones the increase to $7,500
originally scheduled for 1984, to 1988 or 1989, and delays the increase to $10,000 until
1990. Similarly, § 11, the first substantive provision of the Act, amends I.R.C. §
48(c)(2)(A) and delays the increase in the amount of used property eligible for the in-
vestment tax credit, currently at $125,000. The scheduled 1985 increase to $150,000 will
not take place until 1988.
26. The fact that the "at risk" rules of § 465 do not apply to real estate investments
was not unintentional. Congress fashioned the statute to apply to certain taxpayers and
certain activities. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 introduced § 465 to curtail a taxpayer's
ability to claim tax benefits such as depreciation deductions in excess of the sum of his
cash investment and recourse obligation in that activity. Congress expanded § 465 in
1978 to cover additional activities and to provide for the recapture of certain prior
deductions.
Section 465 does not contradict the Crane treatment of basis. The section limits the
deductible net loss from an activity to the amount that a taxpayer places "at risk" in
that activity. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1984). A taxpayer may consider "at risk" in an activity an
amount that consists of his cash contributions, the adjusted basis of property he contrib-
utes, and amounts borrowed for which he has personal liability or for which he has
pledged property other than that used in the activity or financed by debt secured by
contributed property. I.R.C. § 465(b)(1)(A) and (B)(1984). Borrowed amounts are not "at
risk" if borrowed from a lender which has an interest in the activity aside from a creditor
relationship or from related parties as described in § 168(e)(4) of the Code. I.R.C. §
465(b)(3)(1984). Moreover, a taxpayer is not "at risk" with respect to amounts purport-
7
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erty, judicial doctrines may impair an investor's ability to in-
clude nonrecourse debt in basis. These doctrines are consistent
with the well-known principle that, "[A] taxpayer's literal com-
pliance with statutory criteria will not of itself entitle the tax-
payer to the desired tax treatment if, in a broad view, that result
contravenes an underlying tax policy. '27 Certainly, when the cir-
cumstances of a contractual undertaking manifest an agreement
without economic substance, that is, without a legitimate
businss purpose other than the avoidance of taxation, courts will
disregard its form and label it a "sham transaction. '28 Under
these principles, a taxpayer cannot include any nonrecourse debt
undertaken in the purchase of a property in the property's basis
for depreciation purposes when he enters the transaction solely
for the purpose of tax reduction without expectation of profit.29
Courts have utilized the sham transaction doctrine to deny
depreciation deductions in sale-leaseback arrangements.30 In a
typical sale-leaseback arrangement, the original owner of depre-
ciable property sells it to another party. The buyer thereafter
rents it to the seller (original owner), and thus the property's
"user" remains the same. The parties may structure the terms of
the sale and the rental agreement so that the buyer's installment
edly at risk but which are protected against loss by an arrangement such as nonrecourse
financing, guarantees or stop loss agreements. I.R.C. § 465(b)(4)(1984). The at risk limi-
tation does not forever bar deduction of amounts currently disallowed. Instead, the limi-
tation postpones the deduction allowable to a particular activity to the next succeeding
taxable year, subject again to the at risk limitation. I.R.C. § 465(b)(5)(1984). As a result,
§ 465 treats nonrecourse financing harshly and embodies a concept of personal liability.
Regardless of the amount of the taxpayer's basis in the investment under Crane, the
section permits only those amounts a taxpayer actually invests to be considered "at risk"
and, therefore, to generate deductible losses. It is clearly an anti-tax shelter provision.
The Supreme Court observed in a Tufts footnote that, despite this characteristic of § 465
that "may foreshadow a day when nonrecourse and recourse debts will be treated differ-
ently, neither Congress nor the Commissioner has sought to alter Crane's rule of includ-
ing nonrecourse liability in both basis and the amount realized." 461 U.S. 300, 309 n.7
(1983).
27. FEC Liquidating Corp. v. United States, 548 F.2d 924, 926 (Ct. Cl. 1977). "[T]he
lawyer's passion for technical analysis of the statutory language should always be diluted
by distrust of a result that is too good to be true." B. BITTKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS & SHAREHOLDERS § 14.51 at 14-128 (1979).
28. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 365-70 (1960); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469-70 (1935); Bridges v. Comm'r, 325 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963);
Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 752 F.2d 89 (1985).
29. See infra text accompanying note 33.
30. See generally Gallagher, Capital Gains and Losses: A Primer, 7 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 197, 220 (1979).
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payments for the purchase of the property approximate the
seller's rental payments to him. 1 When a buyer in a sale-lease-
back exchanges only nonrecourse debt for a property, that is, an
obligation secured only by the property, and the property will
have little or no value at the end of the lease term, the arrange-
ment appears motivated only by a desire to obtain deductions
and not by a desire to acquire an asset.32 The court, in Rice's
Toyota World, Inc. v. Commissioner,33 disallowed deductions in
such a situation and refused to view the transaction as a sale. As
a result, the taxpayer had no basis to depreciate because the
transfer of the asset was a sham for federal tax purposes.
A court may not specifically denominate a transaction a
sham, but may still deny depreciation and interest deductions if
the nonrecourse debt involved is of such magnitude compared to
the value of the mortgaged property that the obligor has no eco-
nomic incentive to discharge the debt.3 4 This principle is well
stated in Estate of Franklin v. Commissioner,3 5 and has been
characterized as the "prudent abandonment" rule. The rule is
31. See infra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
32. See Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C. 184, 196-97 (1983), afl'd in
part, rev'd in part, 752 F.2d 89 (1985).
33. 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1985), afl'g in part, rev'g in part 81 T.C. 184 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Toyota].
34. "The sham transaction theory is broader in scope than an analysis of whether a
nonrecourse debt is properly includable in basis." 81 T.C. at 197 (citing Estate of Frank-
lin v. Comm'r, 544 F.2d 1045, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1976). See infra note 36.
35. 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976).
36. See Toyota, 81 T.C. at 208. See also Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980); Blan-
ton & Ipsen, How to Preserve the Significant Tax Benefits Available from a Sale and
Leaseback Transaction, 10 TAX'N FOR LAW., 324 (1982). The Ninth Circuit in Franklin
does not specifically characterize the transaction at issue as a sham, nor does the deci-
sion state that the court disregarded it in its entirety, the touchstone of the sham trans-
action test. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. The Tax Court in Toyota, more-
over, admits that other courts reserve the term "sham" for a narrow situation in which
the transaction used by the taxpayer is, for example, merely a paper transaction or a
"fake" transmission of money. Nevertheless, both the Tax Court and the Fourth Circuit
in Toyota appear to indicate that the "prudent abandonment rule" is more a component
of the sham transaction doctrine than a separate doctrine. Accord Mankoff, supra note
4, at 82. For example, the Tax Court's opinion discusses Franklin and its analysis of
Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53 (1980), and states that in the latter case it "invali-
dated another sale-leaseback" and "held the transaction was a sham." Toyota, 81 T.C. at
208-09. Consistent with this apparent inclination of the Tax Court to find less substance
in the Franklin facts than the Ninth Circuit did is the fact that, before that case reached
the court of appeals, the Tax Court ruled that the arrangement did not constitute a sale
but merely an option to buy, despite the parties' characterization of it as a sale. Actually,
the Tax Court noted in footnote seven to its decision in Franklin that while "[ilt may be
19851
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stated as follows: When the fair market value of a parcel of
property is at least equivalent to its purchase price,3" payments
on nonrecourse debt encumbering the property "would rather
quickly yield an equity in the property which the purchaser
could not prudently abandon."38 On the other hand, when the
unpaid balance of nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market
value s' of the property, the incentive to repay the borrowed
amount is not present.40 The taxpayer lacks the incentive to re-
pay because "only an imprudent taxpayer would discharge a
nonrecourse debt to retain an asset with a value substantially
less than the amount of the debt."' The Ninth Circuit reasoned
that the transaction was a sham" the judges were reluctant to apply that doctrine to the
facts presented because such a conclusion "makes no provision for the tax treatment of
the purported $75,000 advance interest payment." Estate of Franklin, 64 T.C. 752, 762
n.7 (1975). The Ninth Circuit, concurring in the Tax Court's result in denying a basis for
depreciation, nevertheless rejected the Tax Court's conclusion that the parties' conduct
was necessarily inconsistent with a sale.
37. The point in time relevant to this required equivalence between price and prop-
erty value (or between the amount of unpaid debt and property value) appears to be an
aspect upon which the courts have differed. The Tax Court indicated that the "critical
factual consideration" is whether the foreseeable value will ever meet the equivalency
test. Toyota, 81 T.C. at 204-05. See also Hilton v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 305 (1980), afl'd, 671
F.2d 316 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 907 (1982). The Ninth Circuit, however, has
indicated that a present deduction is available when there is only a foreseeable future
parity. The Ninth Circuit indicated in dicta that, if and when a purchaser's equity be-
comes at least equal to the unpaid debt, the allowability of deductions should be deter-
mined at that point in time. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. This "wait-
and-see" test is much harder to meet than the "foreseeable value" standard, which pre-
sumably would allow basis inclusion immediately when there is merely a reasonable pos-
sibility of future equivalence. For an analysis of the issues involved if a purchaser's eq-
uity satisfies the equivalency test at some point, but a decrease in the property's value
puts the purchaser's equity below the unpaid debt after that point, see Rosenberg, Bet-
ter to Burn Out Than to Fade Away? Tax Consequences on the Disposition of a Tax
Shelter, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 87, 118-20 (1983).
38. 544 F.2d at 1048.
39. "Fair market value" is generally defined as the price a willing buyer and a will-
ing seller would reach, neither party being under a compulsion to buy or sell and both
having knowledge of all relevant facts. Normally courts do not upset a price reached in
arm's length negotiation. See, e.g., McShain v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 998, 1004 (1979). Bar-
gaining at arm's length presumes an adverse economic interest between buyer and seller.
Accordingly, courts are hesitant to accept the parties' price as a true statement of a
property's market value in transactions which involve mutual tax benefits. See Brannen
v. Comm'r, 722 F.2d 695, 702 (11th Cir. 1984).
40. Crane v. Comm'r, 331 U.S. at 14.
41. Toyota, 81 T.C. at 209. An investor's position must be analogous to that of Mac-
beth after the murders of Duncan and Banquo. "I am in blood stepp'd in so far, that
should I wade no more, returning were as tedious as go o'er." W. SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH,
Act III, Scene IV, Lines 135-37.
10
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/4
1985] DEATH OF A FOOTNOTE
that, under these circumstances, no equity in the property ex-
ists. Concurring in the "fundamental" principle that deprecia-
tion deductions flow from investment in property and not
merely from technical ownership, the court in Franklin ruled
that the taxpayer did not have a basis in the property and there-
fore disallowed depreciation deductions.42
As with many sham transaction cases, Franklin involved a
sale and leaseback.4 s The taxpayer in Franklin purchased an Ar-
izona motel. The contract of sale recited a price of $1.22 million,
and required the purchaser to pay $75,000 of prepaid interest
immediately and $9045.36 monthly for ten years. Of each
$100,000 payment, only $15,000 was payment of principal. The
contract required a "balloon payment" of the remaining debt at
the end of the tenth year. The parties anticipated that this bal-
loon payment amount, which was without recourse, would be ap-
proximately $975,000. The purchaser leased the property back to
the seller for rental payments which closely approximated the
amounts of principal and interest to be paid by the purchaser.44
The Ninth Circuit distinguished these facts from those in Amer-
ican Realty Trust v. U.S.,4 5 Manual A. Mayerson46 and Hud-
42. 544 F.2d at 1049 (citing Gladding Dry Goods Co., 2 B.T.A. 336 (1925)). Accord
Brannen v. Comm'r, 722 F.2d at 701-02.
43. Frank Lyon Co. v. U.S., 435 U.S. 561 (1978) is the sale-leaseback decision usu-
ally cited for its exhaustive treatment of the sham transaction doctrine. In Frank Lyon
Co., the Court held this doctrine inapplicable to the taxpayer's actions. Frank Lyon Co.
involved a bank which sold a building to a corporate purchaser and then leased the
building from the purchaser because state and federal regulations prohibited the bank
from using conventional financing. The lease included an option for the bank to repur-
chase the building. The Supreme Court found the transaction a legitimate sale-lease-
back, not a sham, despite the fact that the bank's rental obligation under the lease was
equal to the purchaser's payments under the sale. Id. at 583-84. The Court in Frank
Lyon Co. stated that when a transaction "with economic substance ... is compelled or
encouraged by business or regulatory realities, is imbued with tax-independent consider-
ations, and is not shaped solely by tax-avoidance features that have meaningless labels
attached, the Government should honor the allocation of rights and duties effectuated by
the parties." Id. The Tax Court in Rice's Toyota World, Inc. noted that most courts
decided sale-leaseback cases in a fact dependent manner, citing the concern of some
commentators concerning the "lack of consistency in the judiciary's approach." Toyota,
81 T.C. at 197-98 (citing Wolfman, The Supreme Court in the Lyon's Den: A Failure of
Judicial Process, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 1075 (1981)).
44. The taxpayer in Frank Lyon Co. did not suffer adverse consequences because of
this fact. The Tax Court held that the arrangement created an option to buy, not a sale.
See supra note 43.
45. 498 F.2d 1194 (4th Cir. 1974).
46. 47 T.C. 340 (1966), acq. in result, Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. The court in
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speth v. Commissioner47 on grounds that the taxpayer in Frank-
lin had not demonstrated, as had the taxpayers in those cases,
that the purchase price approximated the value of the property
involved. Consequently, the court ruled that, unlike payments
by those taxpayers, payments by the taxpayer in Franklin would
not give him a substantial stake in the motel property "so long
as the unpaid balance of the purchase price exceed[ed] the then
existing fair market value" of the property.4 8 Therefore, the
court reasoned that an investment, the essential requisite for de-
preciation, was lacking."'
Viewed on the whole, the court's language in Franklin does
not indicate that the court considered the transaction a sham.
Instead, the court indicated in dicta that such substantial tax
benefits as depreciation and interest deductions could validly ac-
crue to the taxpayer under the contractual agreement in ques-
tion5" if in the future the property's fair market value were to
increase "to an extent that permits the purchaser to acquire an
equity."'51 The court indicated that the amount of depreciation
deductions should be measured by reference to the basis of the
property "at the date the increments to the purchaser's equity
commenced." 52 Although not specifically stated by the court, the
point in time it identified is presumably the date on which the
fair market value of the property rises enough to equal the di-
Mayerson noted that the competitive equality afforded recourse and nonrecourse debt in
basis calculations is justified from a policy standpoint because commercial real estate is
normally financed with nonrecourse debt. Id. at 352. Two commentators criticized May-
erson for not characterizing the debt as contingent in nature and, thus, not properly
includable in basis. Del Cotto, Basis and Amount Realized Under Crane: A Current
View of Some Tax Effects in Mortgage Financing. 118 U. PA. L. REv. 69, 82 (1969);
Columbia Note, supra note 10, at 1515-16. The Internal Revenue Service has indicated it
will follow Mayerson when the value of the property involved at least equals the debt
encumbering it, and the other facts of the transaction indicate a purchase for legitimate
business reasons. Rev. Rul. 69-77, 1969-1 C.B. 59. See also Rev. Ruls. 82-225, 1982-2 C.B.
100, 80-42, 1980-1 C.B. 182, 77-110, 1977-1 C.B. 58; Rutgers Note, supra note 4, at 946
n.91.
47. 509 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1975).
48. 544 F.2d at 1048.
49. Id. at 1049. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
50. 544 F.2d at 1048-49. The Ninth Circuit's indication that a foundation existed in
Franklin for building future tax benefits is important because it suggests that the court
considered the prudent abandonment rule a test separate from the sham transaction
doctrine and not a component thereof. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
51. 544 F.2d at 1048-49.
52. Id. at 1049 n.5.
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minishing unpaid portion of the debt.5 3 In any event, neither
Tufts nor the 1984 Tax Act appears to impair the vitality of the
prudent abandonment rule.5 The concept will apparently con-
tinue to be an important government weapon for striking down
taxpayer attempts to take advantage of Crane's basis rule when
the economic facts of a transaction do not justify including non-
recourse debt in basis.
B. Crane and Amount Realized
The Supreme Court in Crane did not clearly indicate, as it
did with respect to basis, whether amount realized includes the
full amount of nonrecourse debt. In Crane, the property's fair
market value was equal to the nonrecourse debt encumbering it
when the taxpayer sold it. Under those circumstances, the court
required the taxpayer to include the full amount of the nonre-
course debt in amount realized. However, in what became the
most celebrated footnote in American tax law,55 the Court sug-
gested that the tax code may not always require including the
full amount of nonrecourse debt in amount realized. In that
footnote, footnote thirty-seven, the Court stated:
Obviously, if the value of the property is less than the amount
of the mortgage, a mortgagor who is not personally liable can-
not realize a benefit equal to the mortgage. Consequently, a
different problem might be encountered where a mortgagor
abandoned the property or transferred it subject to the mort-
gage without receiving boot.58
Several decisions that predate, or are contemporaneous
with, Crane are indicative of the judicial treatment of the tax
consequences of transferring mortgaged property subject to non-
recourse debt and serve to illustrate the historical controversy. 57
In Lutz & Schramm Co. v. Commissioner," the taxpayer, in
1925, mortgaged certain earlier acquired property for $300,000.
53. Id. at 1048-49. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. See infra sources cited in note 138.
55. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
56. Crane, 331 U.S. at 14 n.37.
57. For a discussion of the controversy, see generally Simmons, Nonrecourse Debt
and Amount Realized: The Demise of Crane's Footnote Thirty-Seven, 59 OR. L. REv. 3,
11-12 (1980).
58. 1 T.C. 682 (1943).
1985] 415
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When the taxpayer experienced business difficulties in 1934, it
renegotiated the mortgage agreement with the mortgagee with
the result that the debt was secured only by the buildings and
improvements covered by the mortgage. In 1937 the taxpayer
transferred the mortgaged property to the mortgagee in full sat-
isfaction of the debt. The taxpayer first reported a gain from the
transaction, calculated by subtracting its adjusted basis from the
amount of the debt satisfied, but later claimed a refund for a
gain erroneously reported. In its claim, the taxpayer asserted
that it realized no gain from the transfer because the adjusted
basis of the property then exceeded its fair market value. The
court rejected the assertion, stating that the "fair market value
of the property transferred is immaterial under the provisions of
the revenue act in the computation of gain or loss from the dis-
position of the property."59 The court reasoned that the tax-
payer had benefited from using the mortgage proceeds over a
period of years and had paid the debt by transferring the prop-
erty to its creditor. The court therefore found that the taxpayer
realized the gain reported in an amount equal to the unpaid
amount of the debt less the taxpayer's adjusted basis after de-
preciation.60 This gain was gain realized from the disposition of
the real property, not from the discharge of the debt.
The facts in Lutz & Schramm Co. were similar to the facts
in R. O'Dell & Sons v. Commissioner." R. O'Dell & Sons in-
volved an involuntary transfer of property by foreclosure sale
pursuant to state law. After the sale, the mortgagee did not seek
a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, and the court
found that the forced disposition of the property fully canceled
the debt. Accordingly, the court held that the debtor-taxpayer
realized gain to the extent that the extinguished debt exceeded
the taxpayer's basis. On appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the Tax Court's decision.6 2 The court reasoned
59. Id. at 685.
60. Id. at 689. For a discussion of the view that such transactions produce income by
the discharge or foregiveness of debt, see infra notes 114-18 and accompanying text. For
the view that Justice Blackmun's Tufts decision is consistent with the cancellation of
indebtedness approach exemplified by U.S. v. Kirby Lumber Co., and that Justice Black-
mun should have identified his "obligation to repay" rationale as the progeny of Kirby,
see Rutgers Note, supra note 4, at 956.
61. 8 T.C. 1165 (1947), afJ'd, 169 F.2d 247 (3d Cir. 1948).
62. 169 F.2d 247, 248-49 (3d Cir. 1948), afl'g 8 T.C. 1165 (1947).
[Vol. 36
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that mortgage foreclosure by judicial sale constitutes a "sale or
exchange" of an asset, and that the debt was fully extinguished
because the mortgagee did not bring a deficiency suit within the
statutory period.
Mendham Corp. v. Commissioner63 is also factually similar
to R. O'Dell & Sons, except that the taxpayer in Mendham
Corp. had not placed the mortgage on the property. Instead, the
original borrower mortgaged the property, depreciated it, and
transferred it, subject to the mortgage, to the corporate taxpayer
in a tax-free exchange. In Mendham Corp., the court deter-
mined that the satisfaction of the taxpayer's debt, although a
predecessor owner had placed the debt upon the property, re-
sulted in gain to the taxpayer upon the taxpayer's disposition of
the property. The court held that the "petitioner must be
treated here exactly as though it had itself placed the mortgage
on the property and benefited by the cash so acquired. 6 4 The
court reasoned that it must view the transaction in its entirety
from the loan to the foreclosure because viewing it otherwise
would not have accounted for the tax consequences of the loan.
The court held that the situation was not distinguishable from
Lutz & Schramm Co. and R. O'Dell & Sons, and, therefore, the
successor corporation recognized taxable gain equal to the mort-
gage proceeds less the adjusted basis of the property.
5
One commentator, Professor Joshua Rosenberg, identifies
the rationale connecting these cases as the court's view that a
taxpayer under these circumstances receives cash for the prop-
erty at the loan's inception. Professor Rosenberg rejects this ra-
tionale, especially in the case of purchase money obligations,
when cash is not exchanged. He prefers to view the time of an
"exchange" as the point when a property is surrendered to can-
cel a debt, rather than the point when money is borrowed. 66 The
debt cancellation, property transfer issue is an important aspect
of the Tufts decision.
The cases decided after Crane and before Tufts are also im-
portant to understanding the historical significance of footnote
63. 9 T.C. 320 (1947). For a discussion of the case, see generally Simmons, supra
note 57, at 12-13.
64. 9 T.C. at 325.
65. Id.
66. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 114-17.
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thirty-seven. In Parker v. Delaney,6 7 the First Circuit Court of
Appeals addressed whether the amount realized from the dispo-
sition of properties may exceed the taxpayer's adjusted basis in
them calculated in the year the taxpayer conveys the properties
to satisfy the debt encumbering them. The taxpayer contended
that, by conveying the properties to the mortgagee for no cash
subject to the outstanding nonrecourse mortgage, he realized
"nothing or in any event nothing in excess of the adjusted ba-
sis" ' of the properties, even though the mortgaged amount ex-
ceeded the adjusted basis. The Parker court stated that the
Court in Crane must have assumed that a transaction produced
gain to the extent that debt encumbering a property exceeded
its adjusted basis, and refused to distinguish Crane. Conse-
quently, the court in Parker held that the full amount of the
debt must be included in amount realized. As in Crane, the
court observed that the taxpayer included the loan amount in
determining the basis of the properties for depreciation pur-
poses. Citing the similar treatment in Crane, the court observed
that the disposition effectively released the taxpayer from the
mortgage obligation, even though he was not personally liable.6
The taxpayer in Parker also argued that the debt exceeded the
value of the properties at the time of disposition and, therefore,
the exception in footnote thirty-seven to Crane should apply.
The court, however, found no evidence to substantiate those
facts, and deferring to the district court, treated the values as
equal.
Authors have cited Judge Magruder's brief concurring opin-
ion in Parker for the proposition that the amount of a taxpayer's
cash investment in the property should limit depreciation. In
other words, a taxpayer could include borrowed funds in the ba-
sis for depreciation purposes only to the extent of the principal
actually repaid when the deduction is sought.70 One commenta-
tor, however, has noted that the uncertainty produced by Parker
and similar cases may stem from "the failure to require an ap-
propriate method of depreciation" '1 and not from the Crane rulb
67. 186 F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950).
68. Id. at 458.
69. Id.
70. M. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 231-32 (1982).
71. Id. at 236.
[Vol. 36
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requiring inclusion of nonrecourse debt in the amount to be
depreciated. 72
The most important case in the period between the deci-
sions in Crane and Tufts is the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
decision in Millar v. Commissioner." The decisions in Millar
and Tufts produced an intercircuit conflict with respect to foot-
note thirty-seven, which was subsequently resolved by the Su-
preme Court in Tufts. As in Parker, the court in Millar ad-
dressed whether taxpayers must recognize taxable gain upon the
surrender of property that completely satisfies a nonrecourse ob-
ligation secured solely by the property. At the time of the dispo-
sition in Millar, as in Tufts, the value of the nonrecourse obliga-
tion exceeded the value of the property. The court recognized a
clear confrontation with Crane and held that the footnote did
not create an exception to the Crane rule.74 Therefore, the court
refused to relieve the taxpayers of the otherwise taxable conse-
quences of the surrender.
Millar is an example of the view that Crane rests upon the
rationale that tax benefits enjoyed previously by a nonrecourse
debtor require full inclusion of the debt in amount realized. To
allow otherwise, the court reasoned, would entitle the taxpayer
to "the type of double deduction .. . the Supreme Court so
clearly disapproved in Crane."75 The Third Circuit's concern
with allowing a double deduction stemmed from the fact that
the taxpayers' original basis in the property was zero, but was
increased by the contribution of the nonrecourse loan funds. In
Millar, the taxpayers claimed deductions for interest and for a
net operating loss which reduced their basis in the property be-
low the outstanding nonrecourse indebtedness. Because the tax-
payers had substantially reduced the adjusted basis of the prop-
erty and surrendered it after it had declined in value to cancel
72. Id. See also S. SURREY, P. McDANiEL, & J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM FOR
1976 19 (1976).
73. 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978). For a discussion of Millar, see generally Friedland,
Tufts and Millar: Two Views of the Crane Case and its Famous Footnote, 57 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 510 (1982); Note, Millar: Requiem for Crane's Footnote 37?, 41 U. PiTT. L.
REv. 343 (1980).
74. 577 F.2d at 215. The Court in Millar cautioned that footnote thirty-seven in
Crane was dicta, but found the holding in Crane controlling. Id.
75. 577 F.2d at 215. The Supreme Court in Tufts did not address "the validity of
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their indebtedness, the court found that the taxpayers must rec-
ognize taxable gain. The court calculated the amount of the gain
as the amount of the outstanding nonrecourse debt less the
property's adjusted basis.76
The Second Circuit confronted a similar issue in Woodsam
Associates v. Commissioner.7 The issue in Woodsam Associates
was whether a taxpayer realized gain or loss when, after acquir-
ing property which appreciated, the taxpayer placed a nonre-
course mortgage upon it and received cash proceeds exceeding
the property's adjusted basis. The court agreed with the Com-
missioner that executing the nonrecourse mortgage was not a
taxable event and that recognition of gain or loss must be deter-
mined after final disposition of the property. Moreover, the
court held that such borrowings after acquiring an asset do not
increase a taxpayer's basis. In its determination that no disposi-
tion occurred, the court stressed the fact that the taxpayer was
the owner of the property "in the same sense after the execution
of this mortgage that she was before. '7 8 Once again, the court
refused to treat a nonrecourse loan differently from a recourse
loan.
Although the two cases differ factually, Crane and Wood-
sam Associates are consistent. In each case the court did not
distinguish between recourse and nonrecourse borrowings, but
instead acknowledged that both types of loans are true loans
that generate certain tax consequences. In Tufts the Supreme
Court similarly emphasized that a nonrecourse loan is a true
loan with its attendant tax and economic effects.
79
Estate of Delman v. Commissioner0 is another significant
case decided in this time period. In Estate of Delman, the court
rejected the tax benefit rule"' (as distinguished from the tax
76. 577 F.2d at 215.
77. 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). See generally Simmons, supra note 57, at 13-15.
78. 198 F.2d at 359.
79. 461 U.S. at 307.
80. 73 T.C. 15 (1979). For a discussion of the case, see generally Comment, Nonre-
course Mortgage Indebtedness as an Amount Realized: Footnote 37 Revisited, 33 Sw.
L.J. 1257, 1273-76 (1980).
81. The tax benefit rule was also the subject of an important Supreme Court deci-
sion in 1983, Hillsboro v. Comm'r, 460 U.S. 370 (1983), which mandated a tax adjust-
ment for a taxpayer when a later event occurs which is "fundamentally inconsistent"
with the assumptions underlying a deduction previously taken. The taxpayer must make
the adjustment in the tax year in which the later event occurs. For a recent analysis of
[Vol. 36
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 3 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol36/iss3/4
DEATH OF A FOOTNOTE
benefit rationale8 2 of Millar and Crane) as an alternative to the
Crane approach.
In Estate of Delman, a vendor repossessed equipment
which a partnership purchased with nonrecourse financing. At
the time of repossession, both the partnership's adjusted basis in
the property and the remaining balance of the nonrecourse
financing exceeded the fair market value of the property. The
court determined that the repossession of the property securing
the debt constituted a taxable sale or exchange,8 3 and that the
taxpayer realized gain equal to the amount by which the balance
of the nonrecourse loan exceeded the property's adjusted basis.
The Tax Court cited the decisions in Millar, Tufts and Wood-
sam Associates as authority for this conclusion. 4
As in Millar, the court emphasized the tax benefits the
partners realized by including the nonrecourse loan in basis for
purposes of computing depreciation. The court, however, distin-
guished this "tax benefit rationale" from the application of the
"tax benefit rule."8 5 The taxpayer in Delman asserted that the
operation of the tax benefit rule required an actual receipt of
funds or a discharge of a liability, that is an increase in net
worth, in order for a taxpayer to realize income. Because neither
had occurred, the taxpayer argued that it realized no gain. The
court rejected the taxpayer's assertions. Although the court de-
termined that neither a receipt of funds corresponding to prior
depreciation deductions nor a discharge of liability resulted in
increased net worth, the court relied on Crane and held that the
taxpayer realized income which included the amount of the non-
recourse liability. 6
Professor Rosenberg, who has examined the use of the tax
benefit rationale in the cases decided between Crane and Tufts,
believes that reliance on this rationale to justify including nonre-
course debt in amount realized is misplaced. He identifies the
genesis of the tax benefit rationale in the "double deduction"
the rule, see Del Cotto & Joyce, Double Benefits and Transactional Consistency Under
the Tax Benefit Rule, 39 TAx L. REV. 473 (1984).
82. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 95.
83. 73 T.C. at 28 (citing inter alia Helvering v. Hammell, 311 U.S. 504, 506-11
(1941)).
84. 73 T.C. at 28.
85. Id. at 30 n.3.
86. Id. at 30.
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language of Crane, and concludes that this rationale did not un-
derlie the Court's decision in Crane. Moreover, he notes that the
other traditional explanation of Crane, the so-called "economic
benefit rationale" is "contrary to the most basic principles of
taxation.
'87
When the taxpayer in Tufts brought suit before the Tax
Court, no lower court had affirmatively accepted the use of foot-
note thirty-seven to reduce the amount realized upon disposi-
tion. Moreover, whether the Supreme Court intended in Crane
to allow such a reduction when property declined in value had
not been answered.
III. FOOTNOTE THIRTY-SEVEN UPHELD AND THEN REJECTED
Tufts involved a partnership formed to construct an apart-
ment complex in a suburb of Dallas, Texas. The partnership
borrowed $1,851,500 secured by a mortgage which was nonre-
course, both as to the partnership and the partners. The part-
nership included the amount of the nonrecourse debt in the ba-
sis of the property for the purpose of taking depreciation
deductions. As a result of depreciation deductions and other ad-
justments, the property's adjusted basis in August 1972 was
$1,455,740.88 By that time, rental income on the apartment com-
plex had declined to the extent that the investment was worth
$1,400,000 at most. It was thus a "burnt-out shelter," one which
has failed from an economic standpoint.89 In August 1972 the
partners sold their interest to an unrelated party in exchange for
his assumption of the $1,851,500 debt.90
The Internal Revenue Service asserted that the partner-
ship's amount realized included the full amount of the debt.
Therefore, the Service claimed that a $395,760 gain (an amount
realized of $1,851,500 minus the adjusted basis of $1,455,740) oc-
curred. The taxpayers claimed that the nonrecourse debt should
be included in amount realized only to the extent of the prop-
erty's fair market value. This treatment would have created a
87. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 94.
88. 461 U.S. at 302.
89. See Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 87. See also Bertha, supra note 4, at 46.
90. 461 U.S. at 303.
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loss in the transaction.91
The Tax Court rejected the taxpayers' claim that footnote
thirty-seven to Crane limited amount realized to the fair market
value of the property sold. Relying on the Third Circuit's deci-
sion in Millar, the court emphasized the symmetry of the system
established by Crane.2 The court ruled that the taxpayers' in-
clusion of the full amount of the nonrecourse debt to benefit
themselves in taking depreciation deductions required them to
include the same amount to their detriment in calculating the
amount of gain or loss. 3
In a widely criticized decision described by one journal as a
"shock"9 4 to tax practitioners, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Tufts became the first tribunal to expressly follow the sugges-
tion in Crane footnote thirty-seven. The court held that the tax-
payers' amount realized included no part of the nonrecourse
debt in excess of the fair market value of the complex. 5 As a
result, the court allowed the investors a tax loss in addition to
the tax benefits they had already received from the tax shelter
investment. The majority opinion reasoned that when a tax-
payer disposes of property subject to nonrecourse debt, he does
91. Id.
92. Tufts v. Comm'r, 70 T.C. 756, 764-66 (1978)(citing Millar v. Comm'r, 577 F.2d
212, 215 (3d Cir. 1978)).
93. 70 T.C. at 770.
94. Comment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV.
575, 593 (1981).
95. Tufts v. Comm'r, 651 F.2d 1058, 1063 (5th Cir. 1981). It is one of the ironies of
legal history that, but for a filibuster involving another jurist, the author of the majority
opinion, Judge Thornberry, might have heard Tufts as a member of the Supreme Court.
Instead, that tribunal reversed Judge Thornberry's Fifth Circuit decision. In 1968, Chief
Justice Earl Warren announced his retirement from the Court, but conditioned his de-
parture upon the appointment and confirmation of a successor. President Johnson nomi-
nated the Honorable Abe Fortas for that position. Mr. Fortas was already a member of
the Court, however, and his elevation necessarily required the appointment of a new
Associate Justice. President Johnson nominated Judge Thornberry to succeed Justice
Fortas in that position, but opposition to Mr. Fortas' nomination coalesced behind Sena-
tor Robert F. Griffin of Michigan, who led a filibuster in the United States Senate which
prevented the confirmation from coming before the Senate for a vote. On October 1,
1968, the Senate voted 45 to 43 to end debate, but the result was fourteen votes short of
the two-thirds vote required to end a filibuster. N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
The next day, the Fortas' nomination was withdrawn. Id., Oct. 3, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 8.
When the President announced on October 10, 1968 that he would not nominate another
Chief Justice, and that he had asked Warren to remain as Chief Justice, Judge
Thornberry's nomination for Associate Justice became moot. Id., Oct. 3, 1968, § 1, at 1,
col. 8; id., Oct. 11, 1968, § 1, at 1, col. 4.
21
Halliday and Manno: Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road to Tuft
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
not "receive" an economic benefit in the amount of that debt.
Citing Professor Bittker, the court likened including such debt
relief as an amount received to including future real estate taxes
as an amount received because a seller is not obligated to pay
them after a sale."6 The court disagreed generally with Crane's
basic scheme of symmetry, and held that "amount realized"
under I.R.C. section 1001(b) includes only actual money or value
received. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit ruled that, despite the
taxpayers' inclusion of the full amount of the nonrecourse debt
in basis for purposes of depreciation, the taxpayers' amount re-
alized could not exceed the fair market value of the property.
7
The court therefore allowed the taxpayers the loss claimed. If
this result had been upheld, it would have increased the attrac-
tiveness of tax shelters and other highly leveraged nonrecourse
investments.
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Tufts "raised a number of
eyebrows and an equal number of anguished cries."98 The Amer-
ican Bar Association Tax Section's leadership called for partici-
pation in Tufts as amicus curiae on the government's side, but
the Tax Section was overruled by the Association's Board of
Governors."9 According to the New York Times, the case became
somewhat of a cause cgl~bre. Experts in the Tax Section pre-
pared a Supreme Court brief articulating its position that the
Fifth Circuit's ruling was a threat to the fairness and integrity of
the tax system, but the Association's Board refused to authorize
the filing of the brief. Bar leaders were subsequently accused of
acting in fear of offending wealthy clients who would benefit
from such tax incentives. °10
Commentators similarly disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's
holding in Tufts.101 Some commentators proposed rejecting both
96. 651 F.2d at 1062 (citing Bittker, supra note 4, at 282).
97. 651 F.2d at 1063. The concurring opinion acknowledged the fact that its decision
placed a nonrecourse borrower in a better position than one who had risked his own
funds in the investment. 651 F.2d at 1066 (Williams, J., concurring). See also Note, Su-
preme Court Decisions in Taxation: 1981 Term, 36 TAx LAW. (1982).
98. Mankoff, supra note 4, at 79.
99. BNA Daily Tax Report No. 162, K-5 (8-19-83).
100. N.Y. Times, May 3, 1983, at D8, col. 6.
101. See, e.g., Newman, The Resurgence of Footnote Thirty-Seven: Tufts v. Com-
missioner, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (1982); Friedland, supra note 73; Comment, Con-
tra Tufts: The Case Against the Fair Market Value Limitation on Amount Realized, 14
PAc. L.J. 79 (1982); Note, The Continuing Controversy over Crane's Footnote 37: Tufts
[Vol. 36
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the "full inclusion" rule of Crane and the "market value ceiling"
rule of Tufts, and called for a fresh approach to the treatment of
nonrecourse debt.102 One student author suggested that the cal-
culation of basis for gain or loss and for depreciation should re-
flect the taxpayer's equity in the property, and should not in-
clude nonrecourse debt.10 3 The author further suggested that the
Court in Crane adopted the opposite rule with respect to basis
simply to justify what it considered to be the correct amount of
depreciation, and was then forced by the requirements of consis-
tency to include that same amount of debt in amount realized
on disposition. 10 4 The author assailed the Crane scheme of sym-
metry as distorting income. In years in which the calculation of
depreciation on a property involves basis inflated by nonre-
course debt, income is understated. In the year of the property's
disposition, the inclusion of the amount of the debt in amount
realized, when no amount is received "in pocket," overstates in-
come.105 The author characterized the Fifth Circuit's rejection of
the Crane symmetry as the use of footnote thirty-seven "as a
device" to escape what the court found "intellectually distaste-
ful." 0 6 The author suggests that only an investor's equity should
be used as basis for purposes of depreciation and gain or loss if
the property is subject to nonrecourse financing. 10 7 Utilizing this
approach decreases both depreciation deductions available in
the years a taxpayer owns property and amount realized in the
year of disposition. The author further proposes that the
amount of any nonrecourse borrowing after acquiring an asset
should immediately decrease basis and that gain should be rec-
ognized at the time of the borrowing "to the extent of any excess
of mortgage over adjusted basis."' 08 The author recognizes that
some courts have held' mortgaging property not to be a disposi-
tion requiring the recognition of gain. However, the author
v. Commissioner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 753; Rosenberg, supra note 37; Columbia Note,
supra note 10. Contra Pietrovito, supra note 15.
102. See infra notes 103-18.
103. Columbia Note, supra note 10, at 1500. Cf. B. CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 34 (1921) (expressing the view that jurists possess "an intellectual pas-
sion for elegantia juris, for symmetry of form and substance").
104. Columbia Note, supra note 10, at 1529.
105. Id. at 1500.
106. Id. at 1530.
107. Id. at 1498-99.
108. Id. at 1530 n.198.
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states that authority exists for the proposition that "the mort-
gage transaction has 'the quality of a closed, identifiable, in-
come-realizing event,' "109 and, thus, should be treated as a taxa-
ble event.
Professor Rosenberg also assails the result in Crane and
Tufts but indicates that the problem cannot be resolved by
changing the calculation of basis. 110 Instead, he argues that one
should view the Fifth Circuit's acceptance of footnote thirty-
seven as a "point of embarcation" for reaching the proper tax
treatment of a property's disposition:""
To concede that the taxpayer's amount realized on the sale or
exchange of his property does not exceed the fair market value
of the property disposed of is not to concede that the taxpayer
has no tax liability on his disposition of the mortgaged prop-
erty. Instead, this initial concession simply paves the way for
an understanding that taxable income from any given transac-
tion need not be limited by the seller's amount realized."
2
The Fifth Circuit's decision concerning the burnt-out shelter
"simply ignored the fact" that the taxpayer received "excessive
tax benefits" and provided him "still more undeserved tax bene-
fits upon his disposition of the property.""" Rosenberg suggests
several compromise approaches based upon the tax benefit rule
and the concept of debt cancellation income. 1 4 An examination
of Rosenberg's analyses of these approaches is essential to de-
velop an understanding of the conflicting economic and fiscal
considerations in Tufts and Crane. The following example is
consistent with the use of footnote thirty-seven as a "point of
embarcation" because amount realized is limited to the value of
the property at the point of disposition. According to this exam-
ple, an investor who purchases property for $400,000 in ex-
change for $20,000 cash and a $380,000 nonrecourse note and
who subsequently deducts $100,000 for depreciation should rec-
ognize $180,000 of ordinary income and $100,000 of capital loss
109. Id. (citing Lurie, Mortgagor's Gain or Mortgaging Property for More Than
Cost Without Personal Liability, 6 TAx L. REV. 319, 323 (1951)).
110. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 144.
111. Id. at 92.
112. Id. at 95.
113. Id. at 144.
114. Id. at 145.
[Vol. 36426
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if he later disposes of the property for $200,000.115 Because the
adjusted basis at the time of disposition is $300,000 (the original
basis of $400,000, less depreciation deductions of $100,000), the
capital loss is $100,000 (the excess of the $300,000 basis over the
$200,000 received). However, Rosenberg asserts that, because
the taxpayer satisfied a debt of $380,000 by surrendering prop-
erty worth only $200,000, he should recognize debt cancellation
income of $180,000. Professor Barnett reached the identical con-
clusion in the amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in
Tufts."" Consistent with the fact that the taxpayers' counsel in
Tufts confirmed that such a proposition is "widely feared by
many tax practitioners,"' " 7  its logic so impressed Justice
O'Connor that she might have adopted it had she not felt con-
strained by the long history of Crane's acceptance to concur in
the unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court." 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tufts to resolve
the conflict between the Third and Fifth Circuits on this vital
issue.11 Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous court, closed
115. Id. at 114-16; cf. note 11 to the Supreme Court's decision in Tufts. Note 11
states that this rationale, which was also the gist of Professor Barnett's amicus brief (see
infra notes 116, 128-30 and accompanying text), would have required the taxpayers in
Tufts to recognize $450,000 in ordinary income and a $50,000 capital loss. Comm'r v.
Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 310-12 n.11 (1983).
116. See 461 U.S. at 310-12 n.. See also infra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
117. Mankoff, supra note 4, at 79.
118. See infra notes 128-36 and accompanying text.
119. The Supreme Court's detailed analysis and definitive resolution of this intercir-
cuit conflict must be countenanced by those who wish to establish a National Court of
Appeals with power to deny the Supreme Court ultimate jurisdiction over these conflicts.
See generally Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing its
Caseload to Achieve its Constitutional Purposes, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1 (1983).
Some proposals for such a tribunal would vest it with the power to review all certio-
rari petitions to the Supreme Court. More importantly, these proposals would prevent
the Supreme Court from reviewing any denial of that writ by the National Court of
Appeals and any decision of that court on the merits after a granting of certiorari. Id. at
9. As a result, many intercircuit conflicts, including those of national and historical im-
portance such as the Tufts-Millar division on footnote thirty-seven, could be finally de-
cided at a level lower than the tribunal which has traditionally acted in this function.
This loss of jurisdiction supports the criticism of the National Court of Appeals concept
as an unconstitutional delegation of the authority vested by the founding fathers in "one
Supreme Court," and as an innovation which "would deprive the Court of essential func-
tions and information in the selection and resolution of fundamental national issues." Id.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 369 (A. Hamilton)(Hallowell ed. 1857).
Former Secretary Coleman reviewed three recent proposals to relieve the Supreme
Court's caseload which would preserve the Court's jurisdiction in these matters. In 1983,
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the opening created by Crane footnote thirty-seven a generation
before. After an extensive review of authority, Justice Blackmun
recognized that Crane requires a symmetrical treatment of non-
recourse debt: "Because no difference between recourse and
nonrecourse obligations is recognized in calculating basis, Crane
teaches that the Commissioner may ignore the nonrecourse na-
ture of the obligation in determining the amount realized upon
disposition of the encumbered property.'
20
The Court reasoned that the only difference between a re-
course and a nonrecourse obligation is that in the latter the
lender's sole remedy is foreclosing on the encumbered property.
Therefore, when a property's value falls below the amount of
nonrecourse debt encumbering it, the lender's ability to protect
its interest is impaired because it becomes feasible for the bor-
rower to relieve himself of the obligation by abandoning the
Chief Justice Burger proposed the establishment of a special panel of judges, drawn from
each federal circuit, empowered to resolve all intercircuit conflicts. This proposal, unlike
the National Court of Appeals proposal, would give the Supreme Court the power to
grant certiorari after a decision by the panel. Coleman, supra, at 9. Associate Justice
Byron White recommends that intercircuit conflicts be resolved by forcing a federal
court of appeals to hold an en banc hearing before it promulgates a decision inconsistent
with another circuit's decision. The first en banc decision so rendered would bind all
other circuits unless and until reviewed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 10. Had this sys-
tem existed when Tufts was decided, Judge Thornberry would have had to convene the
Fifth Circuit en bane before handing down the decision which contradicted Millar. Once
promulgated, the decision would have bound all the circuits, including the Third Circuit
which, by hearing the case first, would not have had an opportunity to bind all the cir-
cuits. Theoretically, eleven circuits could have agreed with Millar, but the Fifth Circuit,
by hearing the issue last, could have bound the other circuits to its acceptance of foot-
note thirty-seven with an adverse decision en banc. Id. at 10.
Mr. Coleman recommended a third alternative. His suggestion shares with Justice
White's the advantage of having the conflict resolved in the first instance at the very
level at which it was created. Essentially, a litigant adversely affected by a federal ap-
peals court decision which contradicts that of another circuit would be able to petition
the court in which he lost for a special rehearing. A tribunal consisting of three judges
from each of the two conflicting circuits and one judge designated by the Chief Justice
from a "neutral" circuit would conduct the rehearing. Thus, after the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Tufts, three judges from the Fifth Circuit, three from the Third Circuit, and
a judge appointed by the Chief Justice from one of the other eleven circuits would have
reviewed Judge Thornberry's decision. Again, residual power to identify and correct an
error by granting certiorari would be within the purview of the Supreme Court. Id. at 18.
While it is difficult to argue with the conclusion that the overwhelming caseload of the
Court makes it advisable to consider the establishment of a new panel for intercircuit
disagreements, any such establishment should not wrest from the Court the ultimate
power to hear and correct any decision of that tribunal.
120. 461 U.S. at 309.
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property. 121 The adverse effect on the lender is not relevant be-
cause it "does not erase the fact that the mortgagor received the
loan proceeds tax-free and included them in his basis on the un-
derstanding that he had an obligation to repay the full
amount.' 1 22 The Court stated that the crux of the rule in Crane
was the characterization of a nonrecourse debt as a "true loan,"
carrying with it an obligation to repay as if the debt were re-
course.1 23 Justice Blackmun specifically recognized this charac-
terization as a basis for the decision in Tufts, and stated that in
view of that fact it was unnecessary to decide whether Millar's
attribution of the "double deduction" theory to Crane was
correct.
124
From the debtor's viewpoint, a purchaser's assumption of a
liability encumbering the property purchased has the same ef-
fect as if the purchaser paid the debtor in cash and the debtor
then transferred the cash to the original lender to discharge
what he owed. 125 Justice Blackmun's decision specifically re-
jected the notion that an investor could include nonrecourse
debt in basis for depreciation purposes, but exclude all or part of
it when computing gain: "Unless the outstanding amount of the
mortgage is deemed to be realized, the mortgagor effectively will
have received ...an unwarranted increase in the basis of his
property.' ' 26 Therefore, the Court reasoned that allowing a tax-
payer to limit the amount realized to the property's fair market
value at the time of his sale would allow him "to recognize a tax
loss for which he has suffered no corresponding economic
loss. ' 1127 The impact of this language with respect to tax shelters
is obvious because an important aspect of tax shelters is the
availability of tax deductions, credits, and losses when there has
been "no corresponding economic loss."
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor indicated that
viewing the facts in isolation could lead to a holding consistent
with Professor Barnett's position as amicus in Tufts. 28 As Jus-
121. Id. at 312.
122. Id. (citing Woodsam Assocs. v. Comm'r, 198 F.2d 357, 359 (2d Cir. 1952).
123. Id. at 312-13.
124. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
125. 461 U.S. at 312-13.
126. Id. at 310.
127. Id. at 313.
128. Id. at 317-20 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For criticism of the concurring opin-
1985]
27
Halliday and Manno: Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road to Tuft
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tice O'Connor interprets Professor Barnett's position, the trans-
action at issue in the Crane-Tufts situation should be separated
into two aspects: (1) the ownership and sale of the property and
(2) the arrangement and retirement of the loan.12 9 Such a sepa-
ration calls for treating the mortgage as a separate, independent
transaction. Most importantly, according to Justice O'Connor,
such an analysis would tax the actual events of the case (which
essentially involve the purchase of property with nonrecourse
financing coupled with a sale, after a decline in value, to a buyer
who assumes the debt) in the same manner as an "economically
identical hypothesized transaction."' 130
The Justice's hypothetical transaction consists of a cash
purchase of property and the subsequent execution of a nonre-
course loan secured by it. The hypothetical transaction also in-
cludes a later cash repayment of the loan at the declining mar-
ket value of the property and a market value sale of the
property to a third party. As mandated by Crane, under the
"property aspect" of the transaction, the fair market value of
the property at purchase would represent the taxpayer's basis,
and its fair market value at disposition would represent the pro-
ceeds of its sale. The taxpayer's gain or loss on the sale would
equal the difference between the sale proceeds and the acquisi-
tion cost. Consequently, the taxation of the property transaction
would reflect the economic fate of the property.' Under the
"loan aspect" of the transaction, although the mortgagor ob-
tained cash from the mortgagee, the mortgagor has no taxable
income because he is obliged to repay the loan. However, when
the mortgagor satisfies the debt by surrendering property with a
value less than the outstanding balance of the debt, debt cancel-
lation principles dictate that the mortgagor should recognize in-
come equal to the difference between the loan balance satisfied
and the property's value. Justice O'Connor notes that, under
this approach, taxation of the loan transaction reflects the eco-
nomic fate of the loan.
132
Justice O'Connor also considered separating the two aspects
ion, see Mankoff, supra note 4, at 81; Coleman, supra note 119, at 27.
129. 461 U.S. at 318.
130. Id.
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of the transaction important because different types of income
are subject to different treatment under the Code.133 Separating
the transaction allows for ordinary income treatment of the debt
cancellation income and capital gain treatment of income from
the property aspect of qualifying property."" Despite her con-
cern for separating the transaction, Justice O'Connor joined in
the majority decision which included the full amount of nonre-
course debt in amount realized and which tended to collapse the
financing and property aspects of the transaction into a single
event. In doing so, Justice O'Connor noted that the reference in
I.R.C. section 1001(b) to the "amount realized from the sale or
other disposition of property" may be read reasonably to permit
a computation of amount realized in that manner.135 Interest-
ingly, the majority opinion acknowledges that Professor Bar-
nett's assertion that the property and financing portions of the
transactions should be accounted for separately could be justi-
fied. However, in a more summary fashion, the majority con-
ceded that the Commissioner had not adopted this analysis and
that the Code did not compel him to do so.136
Thus, the Court unanimously rejected other approaches,
whatever their wisdom, and held that a taxpayer must fully in-
clude nonrecourse debt in amount realized upon the disposition
of property subject to that debt, regardless of whether the out-
standing debt exceeds the property's fair market value.13 7 By so
ruling, the Court limited the tax benefits available in burnt-out
tax shelters, specifically refused to accept the suggestion in
Crane footnote thirty-seven, and resolved the controversy which
had plagued the determination of the tax results in such situa-
tions since the Truman Administration.138
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 320.
136. Id. at 310-12 n.1.
137. Id. at 313.
138. Although the Supreme Court's holding that nonrecourse debt must be included
in amount realized is unequivocal, there is a common sense exception to it. As discussed
above, in Estate of Franklin, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow depreciation on the
grounds there was no true investment in the property. See supra notes 45-54 and accom-
panying text. The court also denied the taxpayer's interest deductions for amounts paid
on the nonrecourse note. In Estate of Franklin, the court attempted to define debt in
such a situation: "the purchaser, in the absence of personal liability, must confront a
situation in which it is presently reasonable from an economic point of view for him to
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IV. Tufts AND THE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS
Tufts and several earlier cases139 involved business arrange-
ments which were formally organized as partnerships, a business
form considered ideal for tax shelters.140 The taxpayers in those
cases, as in Tufts, argued that I.R.C. section 752(c) required that
amount realized on the sale or disposition of partnership prop-
erty be limited to the fair market value of the property trans-
make a capital investment in the amount of the unpaid purchase price." 544 F.2d at
1049. In view of the Tufts requirement of symmetry between basis and amount realized,
finding that no bona fide debt exists in a particular case should preclude the Commis-
sioner from successfully claiming that the amount of debt discharged upon disposition
should be included in amount realized. Accord Andrews, On Beyond Tufts, 61 TAXES 949
(1983), in which the author states:
Franklin is in no way inconsistent with Tufts. The point of Tufts is not that
value of the securing property is irrelevant to the treatment of nonrecourse
debt, but that the relevant value is value when the debt was incurred, which is
exactly consistent with Franklin. It follows also that if nonrecourse debt were
properly recorded at the outset at something other than its stated principal
amount, because of the value of the securing property or otherwise, then only
that amount needs to be taken into income account as a credit on subsequent
disposition of the property.
Id. at 954. A Tax Court footnote to Rice's Toyota World, Inc., a recent Fourth Circuit
case, and the statement of a learned commentator also support this conclusion, which is
consistent with the Treasury Regulations. See Odend'bal v. Comm'r, 748 F.2d 908, 912-
13 (4th Cir. 1984); Toyota, 81 T.C. at 196 n.9; Sanders, supra note 4, at 3 n.5 (citing
Treas. Reg. § 1.1001-2(a)(3)(1984)). See also Dorr & Lacy, Crane After Tufts: Still Some
Unanswered Questions, 62 TAXES 162, 164-68 (1984). But see Blackburn, Important
Common Law Developments for Nonrecourse Notes: Tufting it Out, 18 GA. L. REV. 1,
38-41 (1983); Bane, Implications of Supreme Court's holding that nonrecourse note
gain not limited by FMV, 12 TAX'N FOR LAW. 4, 7-8 (1983). Contra Note, Nonrecourse
Liabilities as Tax Shelter Devices After Tufts: Elimination of Fair Market Value and
Contingent Liability Defenses, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 904, 929 (1983)("Tufts' holding that a
nonrecourse mortgage must be treated as a true loan in computing both basis and
amount realized, regardless of fair market value, is thus laudably consistent with
Crane"). Furthermore the 1984 Tax Act "Blue Book" adheres to this view, and also con-
firms that the inartful placement of I.R.C. § 7701(f) is not intended to override Franklin.
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESs., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REV. PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 at 239 (C.I.R. Print
1984); see J. EUSTICE, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984, A SELECTIVE ANALYSIS 5.05[5] [a]
at 5-52 to -55 (1984).
139. See, e.g., Millar v. Comm'r, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); Parker v. Delaney, 136
F.2d 455 (1st Cir. 1950); Estate of Delman v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 15 (1979).
140. See Comment, Nonrecourse Mortage Indebtedness as an Amount Realized.
Footnote 37 Revisited, 33 Sw. L.J. 1257, 1258 (1980); Comment, The Tax Shelter Di-
lemma: Disposition of a Crossover Limited Partnership Interest, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 349
(1974). For a summary of attempts by the Internal Revenue Service to combat the use of
tax shelter limited partnerships by treating them as corporations, see Hayes, Limited
Partnerships-Iowa Style, 32 DRAKE L. REV. 1 (1982).
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ferred. Therefore, these litigants asserted, partnership transac-
tions were beyond the scope of Crane because Congress
specifically provided for a different treatment of partnership in-
terests in I.R.C. section 752.141 Section 752(c) provides that a lia-
bility encumbering a property is the property owner's liability
only to the extent of the property's fair market value. Section
752(d) provides that, in the case of a sale or exchange of a part-
nership interest, liabilities must be treated in the same manner
as nonpartnership related liabilities.
In Tufts, each partner in a partnership sold his partnership
interest and conveyed his rights in the partnership property to
an unrelated third party. Consequently, the partners argued
before the Tax Court that the partnership taxation provisions of
the Code mandated including nonrecourse liabilities on partner-
ship property only to the extent of the fair market value of the
partnerhsip property securing the loan.142 The taxpayers arrived
at this position by applying the fair market value limitation of
I.R.C. section 752(c) to the sale of a partnership interest under
I.R.C. section 752(d). The Commissioner contended that the fair
market value limitation of I.R.C. section 752(c) applied only to
I.R.C. sections 752(a) and 752(b), covering actual or deemed
contributions to and distributions from partnerships. The Com-
missioner further contended that I.R.C. section 752(d) operates
independently of I.R.C. section 752(c). 143 After examining arti-
cles, commentaries, legislative history, and regulations applica-
ble to I.R.C. section 752, the Tax Court determined that the
Commissioner's position was consistent with Congress' intent.
44
Under section 752, therefore, when a partner contributes prop-
erty subject to a liability to a partnership, the partnership is
deemed to assume the liability in an amount not exceeding the
fair market value of the property at the time of contribution.
Each partner's basis in his partnership interest is then adjusted.
Further, when a partnership distributes encumbered property to
a partner, the partner assumes the liability in an amount limited
by the fair market value of the property at distribution. Such a
distribution also requires adjustments in each partner's basis in
141. 461 U.S. at 314.
142. 70 T.C. at 766.
143. Id. at 766-67.
144. Id. at 769.
1985] 433
31
Halliday and Manno: Death of a Footnote: A Current View of Crane and the Road to Tuft
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
his partnership interest.145
The Tax Court gave scant attention to the partnership issue
in other cases decided during the appeal in Tufts. For example,
in Estate of Delman, the Tax Court found that the facts did not
constitute one of the limited situations controlled by subsection
(c) in Tufts. Therefore, the court held that I.R.C. section 752(c)
was inapplicable.
146
In Tufts, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the partnership issue in a footnote after it discussed
footnote thirty-seven. 4 The court reasoned that because its
holding limited the inclusion of nonrecourse debt in amount re-
alized, it eliminated the conflict as to subsections 752(c) and (d).
In other words, the court deemed that its disposition of the
Crane issue required the application of the footnote thirty-seven
fair market value limitation to both partnership and nonpart-
nership transactions. Moreover, the court stated that its resolu-
tion of the issue was consistent with the congressional under-
standing of the Crane doctrine because I.R.C. section 752(c) is
generally considered to be an intentional codification of
Crane.
148
The Supreme Court similarly decided the Crane issue
before dealing with the alternative partnership arguments. The
Court in Tufts examined the structure of the partnership tax
statute and its legislative history, and determined that "[w]hile
the legislative history is certainly not conclusive, it indicates
that the fair market value limitation of section 752(c) was di-
rected to transactions between a partner and his partnership, ' 149
and was not applicable to a transaction between partners and
third parties who are not partners. Citing Treasury Regulations
for support, the Court rejected the taxpayers' asserted "partner-
ship exception" and ruled that I.R.C. section 752(c) does not
limit the amount realized under section 752(d) in the sale of
145. See generally W. MCKEE, IV. NELSON & R. WHrrMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF
PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 6.03 (1977).
146. 73 T.C. at 34.
147. 651 F.2d at 1063 n.8.
148. Id. (citing Perry, Limited Partnerships and Tax Shelters: The Crane Rule
Goes Public, 27 TAX L. REv. 525, 542 (1972)).
149. 461 U.S. at 316 (citing 1 A. WILLIS, J. PERNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP
TAXATION § 44.03 (3d ed. 1981)). See also Simmons, Tufts v. Commissioner: Amount
Realized Limited to Fair Market Value, 15 U.C.D. L. REV. 577, 611-13 (1982).
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partnership interests such as were involved in the case. 5 '
V. TEFRA AND THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984
Because some tax shelters, such as the one examined in
Tufts, rely heavily upon nonrecourse financing, the case has of
course affected tax planning in that area. One observer has re-
marked that society has traditionally viewed tax shelters as
"something rich people did in dark places."'15 Another commen-
tator notes that the "hue and cry" of Congress and the Treasury
Department that such shelters are an "ever increasing drain" on
tax revenues and a "sign of the increasing reluctance of taxpay-
ers to accept a self-assessment system of taxation" might lead an
observer to "conclude that tax shelters had replaced baseball as
our national pastime.' 5 2 The drafters of the compliance provi-
sions of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA) clearly heard this "hue and cry.' 153 One provision"",
imposes a ten percent penalty on a "substantial [tax] underpay-
ment" 155 but provides that a taxpayer may normally avoid the
penalty by showing that: (1) "there is or was substantial author-
150. 461 U.S. at 316 n.17 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(c)(1984)).
151. Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1983, at 1, col. 6 (quoting Daniel Buompane, vice-president
of marketing at E. F. Hutton & Co.). Cf. R. SWANSON & B. SWANSON, TAX SHELTERS: A
GUIDE FOR INVESTORS AND THEIR ADVISORS 2 (1982): "Despite popular belief, tax shelters
were not invented late one April night in the early 1960s by an unscrupulous tax ac-
countant in a shiny suit."
152. Rosen, TEFRA's New Partnership Auditing Procedures: Was the Small Part-
ner Left Out?, 38 TAX L. REV. 479, 480 (1983). See also Goldfein and Cohn, supra note
21, at 331.
153. See generally Palmer, TEFRA Treats Partnerships As Separate Entities
Under Its New Procedural Rules, 58 J. TAx'N 34 (1983); Palmer, How the TEFRA Part-
nership Procedures Affect Partners' Adjustments and Limitations, 58 J. TAX'N 74
(1983).
154. I.R.C. § 6651 (1984). In addition to the sanctions listed in the text, TEFRA also
provides a special penalty when an underpayment of tax is attributable to the taxpayer's
valuation of property at 150% or more of its true cost. I.R.C. § 6659 (1984). Although
this provision does not single out tax shelters for additional adverse treatment, over-
evaluation is a perceived abuse in some shelters. This is different from the understate-
ment penalty. See infra text accompanying notes 155-58. It should also be noted that the
imposition of a penalty under I.R.C. § 6657 (1984) supersedes any penalty under the
substantial understatement of tax rules of I.R.C. § 6651 (1984).
155. A "substantial understatement" exists in a taxable year if the amount of the
understatement of tax for the taxable year exceeds the greater of ten percent of the tax
required to be shown on the return for the taxable year, or $5000. I.R.C. §
6661(b)(1)(1984).
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ity for the treatment" chosen by the taxpayer or (2) "relevant
facts affecting [the] item's tax treatment are adequately dis-
closed in the return or in a statement attached to the return.'
1 56
The safe harbor does not apply, however, to an item attributable
to a tax shelter. 15 7 In that case, the taxpayer may avoid the pen-
alty only if he can present substantial authority for his position
and can show that he "reasonably believed that the tax treat-
ment of such item ... was more likely than not the proper treat-
ment. 1 58 As a result, the taxpayer must overcome a very heavy
burden of proof to escape penalty.
TEFRA also provides for the conduct of partnership audits
at the partnership level. 159 The Treasury Department main-
tained that it needs such auditing power because it is not feasi-
ble to separately audit, within the statute of limitations period,
each partner in a tax shelter limited partnership"0 who adopts a
highly creative, but questionable, tax position."6 ' Another
TEFRA provision attacks tax shelters by imposing a civil pen-
alty on certain persons who organize or participate in the sale of
tax shelters. This promoter penalty is now equal to the greater
of $1000 or twenty percent of the gross income the organizer or
salesperson derives from the shelter. The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice may exact the penalty in two instances: (1) if a person
makes or furnishes a statement about the tax advantages of a
shelter which he knows or should know is materially false or
fraudulent; or (2) if a person overstates a deduction or credit
available to a purchaser of property, by stating that the property
is more than twice its real value." 2 Lastly, TEFRA gives the
156. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(1984).
157. A tax shelter is defined for purposes of the statute as: (1) a partnership or other
entity; (2) any investment plan or arrangement; or (3) any other plan or arrangement
which has as its principal purpose "the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax."
I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(C)(ii)(1984).
158. I.R.C. § 6661(b)(2)(B)(i), (C)(i)(1984).
159. I.R.C. § 6221 (1984). See generally W. McKEE, W. NELSON, & R. WHITMIRE,
FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND PARTNERS 9.02[4] at 9-5 to -19 (1984 Cum.
Supp. No. 3, Vol. 1); Rosen, supra note 152; Sanders, The Role of the "Tax Matters
Partner" in Unified Partnership Proceedings, 1 J. TAX'N OF INV. 3 (1984).
160. Rosen, supra note 152, at 480. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
161. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, PRESIDENT's 1978 TAX PROGRAM 123 (1978)(cited in
Rosen, supra note 152).
162. I.R.C. § 6700(a)(2),(b)(1)(1984). For an evaluation of the government's imple-
mentation of § 6700 and the injunctive power of § 7408 (see infra text accompanying
note 163), see Garahan, The Government's Post-TEFRA Techniques for Combatting
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Treasury Department the right to seek injunctions against pro-
moters of shelters that it perceives to be abusive. 163 These enact-
ments clearly indicate a concerted effort by Congress and the
Treasury Department to protect the public and the revenues
from overly aggressive tax shelters. Reports indicate, for exam-
ple, that as of January 1984, the Internal Revenue Service had
audited approximately 340,000 tax shelter returns as part of the
tax shelter audit program begun in 1973.14 Moreover, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service has issued numerous pronouncements and
rulings against abusive shelters." 5 Clearly, the government is se-
rious in this regard.
If any doubt regarding this situation lingered after TEFRA,
the Tax Reform Act of 1984166 put it to rest. The new Act con-
tains several provisions relating to partnership taxation,
designed to prevent taxpayers from "claiming unintended tax
benefits' 61 7 from the most popular form of tax shelter owner-
ship. The disallowance of tax-free exchange treatment for inter-
ests in different partnerships eliminates the possibility of avoid-
ing Tufts by exchanging one encumbered interest for another.,, 8
The Act includes changes which are intended to prevent part-
ners entering partnerships late in the partnership year from us-
ing "tiered" partnerships and "cash-basis" partnerships to retro-
Abusive Shelters, 1 J. TAX'N OF INV. 184 (1984).
163. I.R.C. §§ 6700, 7402, 7408 (1984). See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 83-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9741 (N.D. Tex 1983); Mid-South Music Corp. v. United States, 579 F.
Supp. 481 (M.D. Tenn. 1983).
164. See Smith and Cheris, Gift and Estate Tax Problems as Well as Income Tax
Aspects of Tax Shelters Must Be Considered, 11 EST. PLAN. 194 (1984). See generally
Garahan, supra note 162. See also Kess & Westlin, Dealing With the Client Wanting
Tax Shelter, EST. PLAN. REV., Nov. 1983, at 81 (this source notes that "[t]he odds
against the taxpayer in the 'shelter audit lottery' have been increased drastically").
165. The most recent of these at the time of this writing was Rev. Rul. 84-175, 1984-
52 I.R.B. 10, stating that the Service will offset an assessed deficiency against a sched-
uled refund resulting from a NOL carryback if it is "highly likely" that the § 6700 pen-
alty would apply.
166. Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984)[hereinafter
cited as TRA 1984].
167. Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
No. 29, at 603 (extra ed., July 6, 1984)[hereinafter cited as CCH Explanation].
168. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 77 (amending I.R.C. § 1031(a)(1984)). See Deficit
Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, Expl. of the Sen. Fin. Comm. (April 2, 1984), 71 STAND. FED.
T.x RPT. (CCH) No. 16, at 243-44 (extra ed., April 15, 1984). See also J. EUSTIc E, supra
note 138, 5.01[4] at 5-22.
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actively allocate partnership items to themselves.6 9 Another
section of the new law prevents partners from shifting among
themselves a gain or a loss sustained on property before its con-
tribution to the partnership. 17 0 The Act includes a provision that
prevents limited partners from including nonrecourse debt guar-
anteed by a general partner in the basis of their partnership
interests.
71
In addition to these and other partnership provisions,7 2 the
1984 Act contains several tax shelter compliance provisions
which are also indicative of the government's intent to identify
and pursue areas of perceived tax shelter abuse. First, the Act
increases the TEFRA promoter penalty from ten percent to
twenty percent of the amount generated by the project. 173 Sec-
ondly, the Act imposes a special rate of interest on underpay-
ments of federal tax when those underpayments are attributable
to a "tax-motivated transaction.' ' 7 4  Normally, the interest
charge is at a designated rate determined semiannually and
based on the average prime rate charged by commercial
169. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 72 (amending I.R.C. § 706 (1984)). See generally
Summary of Tax Provisions As Agreed to by the Conferees, 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) No. 29, at 13 (extra ed., July 3, 1984)[hereinafter cited as JCT Report]; CCH
Explanation, supra note 167, at 51 605-06.
170. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 71(a)(amending I.R.C. § 704(c)(1984)). See gener-
ally JCT Report, supra note 169, at 13; CCH Explanation, supra note 167, at 604.
171. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 79. See I.R.C. § 752 (1982), which directs the
Treasury Department to amend its regulations accordingly and overrules a contrary deci-
sion in Raphan v. United States, 3 U.S. Cl. Ct. 457 (1983). See generally JCT Report,
supra note 169, at 15; CCH Explanation, supra note 167, at T 614.
172. These include legislation dealing with "disguised payments" to partners, at-
tempted avoidance of ordinary income treatment in certain transactions between a part-
ner and the partnership, use of partnerships to achieve a step-up in basis, and attempted
avoidance of recapture rules by corporate partners. TRA 1984, supra note 166, §§ 73-78.
See generally H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 751 and 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) No. 27, at 190-94 (extra ed.,
June 26, 1984)[hereinafter cited as CONF. CoMsM. RPT.]; JCT Report, supra note 169, at
13-15; CCH Explanation, supra note 167, at f 283, 601-15, 650; Pennell, An Analysis of
the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions Affecting Partnerships: Part I, 61 J. TAX'N 332
(1984); Pennell, An Analysis of the Deficit Reduction Act Provisions Affecting Partner-
ships: Part II, 61 J. TAX'N 378 (1984); Cuff, Tax Results of Liquidation of Corporate
Partner Still Unclear Despite TRA 1984, 62 J. TAX'N 88 (1985).
173. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 143(a)(amending I.R.C. § 6700(a)(1984)).
174. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 144(a)(amending I.R.C. § 6621 (1984) to add sub-
section 6621(d)). The definition of "tax motivated transaction" is in subsection
6621(d)(3), added by the new Act.
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banks.175 However, the new Act provides that, with respect to
tax shelter items, the interest charge is 120% of the normal stat-
utory rate.176 Thirdly, the Act extends the injunctive power au-
thorized by TEFRA177 to any activity which constitutes the aid-
ing of an understatement of tax liability from a shelter. 178 The
Conference Committee Report specifically states that this provi-
sion is intentionally designed to catch both promoter and non-
promoter activity in the injunctive net.
7 9
The 1984 Act further addresses the problem of matching an
investor to a shelter. Noting that under prior law the Internal
Revenue Service lacked "complete and systematic information
on which to base its decisions about which tax shelters should be
audited,"'' s0 the Act requires the registration of certain tax shel-
ters by the promoter. 8' The penalty for failure to register is the
greater of $500 or one percent of the aggregate amount invested
in the shelter, but not more than $10,000.182 If there is an inten-
tional disregard of the registration requirements, however, the
$10,000 ceiling does not apply.'83 Any taxpayer claiming a de-
duction or credit from such shelter is subject to a $50 penalty if
the taxpayer does not include on his or her own return the tax
shelter identification number generated by the registration. 8 4 A
provision in the Act which requires a shelter organizer to main-
tain investor lists and to make these lists available to the Inter-
175. I.R.C. § 6621(b),(c)(1984).
176. I.R.C. § 6621(d)(1)(1984)(applicable to interest accruing after December 31,
1984). See I.R.C. § 6621(d)(1984)(added by TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 144(c)). For
example, in any period that the semiannual designated rate is 11%, the tax shelter rate
would be 13.2%.
177. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
178. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 143(b)(amending I.R.C. § 7408 (1984)).
179. CONF. CoMM. RPT., supra note 172, at 227.
180. Id. at 225.
181. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 141(a)(redesignating I.R.C. § 6111 as § 6112, and
adding new § 6111). Shelters which must be registered are generally those in which the
sum of the deductions and 200% of the credits exceeds 200% of the amount contributed
by the investor. See I.R.C. § 6111(c)(1984)(as added by the Act); CCH Explanation,
supra note 167, at 647. See generally Martin, Coping With the Tax Shelter Registra-
tion and Compliance Requirements: New Law and Regs., 62 J. TAX'N 2 (1985).
182. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 141(b)(codified as LR.C. § 6707(a)(1984)).
183. I.R.C. § 6707(a)(2)(1984)(originally enacted as TRA 1984, supra note 166, §
141(b)).
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nal Revenue Service upon request further aids "matching." '185
Lastly, two aspects of the Conference Committee Report do
not directly relate to specific statutory provisions but are signifi-
cant to an understanding of the present status of tax shelters.
First, the Senate version of the new law would have required the
Secretary of the Treasury Department to submit a tax shelter
report to Congress. 186 Although this specific provision is not in
the final text of the Tax Reform Act, the new law authorized the
Treasury Department to study "alternative tax systems," and
pursuant to the conferees' statement that the "Secretary will in-
clude the substance of the Senate amendment's report in the
Treasury's study. . .," the recent Treasury Proposal on Tax Re-
form contains key recommendations on shelters.
8 7
A message from the Congress to the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice is the second significant aspect of the Conference Commit-
tee Report. In their discussion of the Internal Revenue Service's
responsibility with respect to Tax Court cases, the conferees in-
dicate their opinion that,
The Service's settlement policy should be fair and flexible and
only appropriate cases should be litigated. Although in the re-
cent past the Service has offered to settle many tax shelter
cases by permitting taxpayers to deduct out of pocket ex-
penses, the Service no longer routinely offers this as a settle-
ment. This is a constructive change in policy in that a taxpayer
185. TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 142 (codified as I.R.C. § 6113 (1984)). On the
matching problem, see also I.R.C. § 6050J (concerning returns relating to foreclosure and
abandonment of security)(added by TRA 1984, supra note 166, § 148). An examination
of the effect of the Act upon specific types of shelters is beyond the scope of this Article.
See, e.g., Bertha, Tax Shelters Attractive Despite TRA '84, Tas. & EsTs., Feb. 1985, at
46; McCawley, Time Value of Money-TRA Provisions Affecting Real Estate Transac-
tions, 1 TAx MGMT. R.E.J. 20 (1984); Rothman & Vasily, The Tax Reform Act of 1984:
An Analysis of Provisions Affecting Real Estate, 1 TAX MGMT. R.E.J. 3 (1984); Sanders
& Roady, How the New Tax Law Changes the Operating Rules for Real Estate Invest-
ments, 62 J. TAX'N 22 (1985); Sanders & Roady, New Real Estate Rules for Exempt
Financing, Related Party Transactions, Exchanges, 62 J. TAX'N 66 (1985); Scott, Shel-
tering of Income Through Tax Straddles Greatly Restricted by 1984 Tax Law Changes,
62 J. TAx'N 28 (1985).
186. Deficit Reduction Tax Bill of 1984, § 164, 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) No.
16, at 459 (extra ed. 1984); CONF. Comm. RPT., supra note 172, at 223.
187. CONF. Comm. RPr., supra note 172, at 233; Treasury Department Report to the
President on Tax Simplification & Reform (Nov. 24, 1984), 71 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) No. 52 (extra ed., Nov. 29, 1984). For a brief summary of these recommendations,
see Kess & Westlin, Window of Opportunity in Deadly Tax Shelter Proposals, EsT.
PLAN, REv., Jan. 1985, at 1.
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should not expect to be able to deduct out of pocket expenses
regardless of the circumstances of his case. The Service should
assert, without hesitancy in appropriate circumstances, the
penalties that the Congress has provided. In particular, the
negligence and fraud penalties are not currently being applied
in a large number of cases where their application is fully
justified.""8
This specific suggestion to the Internal Revenue Service to "get
tough" on negligence and fraud penalties bespeaks the contin-
ued alliance of the executive and legislative branches in target-
ing tax shelters. Nevertheless, one should not view the Supreme
Court's decision in Tufts as a part of the concerted effort against
sheltered investments. Rather, the considerations previously dis-
cussed, including the Crane symmetry scheme, underlie the
decision.
VI. CONCLUSION
A Supreme Court's affirmance of the Fifth Circuit's decision
in Tufts would have enhanced the attractiveness of leveraged in-
vestments because a burnt-out shelter such as the one in Tufts
would have produced a tax loss rather than a tax gain.1 s9 How-
ever, an affirmance was considered unlikely due to the wide-
spread criticism of the Fifth Circuit opinion, its radical depar-
ture from thirty-four years of precedent, 190 and its violent
sundering of the symmetry inherent in Crane. An affirmance of
the Fifth Circuit would have been more surprising than the orig-
inal decision.' 9 '
In Tufts, the Supreme Court chose not to adopt a powerful
188. CONF. COMM. RPT., supra note 172, at 228. See Garahan, supra note 162, at 190
n.23.
189. But see Comment, Contra Tufts: The Case Against the Fair Market Value
Limitation on Amount Realized, 14 PAC. L.J. 79 (1982) for the view that a judicial af-
firmance of the viability of footnote thirty-seven would have led Congress to enact fur-
ther restrictive legislation to counteract the decision.
190. Rosenberg, supra note 37, at 93; Rutgers Note, supra note 4, at 931 n. 16; Com-
ment, Tufts-The Resurrection of Crane's Footnote 37, 9 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 575 (1981).
191. Cf. Mankoff, supra note 4, at 80 (while Mr. Mankoff acknowledges that "many
observers expected the result," he links this to concern over the effect of an affirmance of
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weapon against tax shelters: the Barnett-Rosenberg analysis.'92
Under this analysis, an investor would recognize both a capital
loss and ordinary income, which would be a devastating scenario
for the taxpayer. Had the Court imposed this result on taxpay-
ers, the decision would have been a crushing blow against tax
shelters. Instead of establishing this "big stick" approach to-
wards tax shelters, the Court relied on stare decisis and upheld a
moderate approach.
Tufts is a classic example of Justice Holmes' oft-quoted ad-
monition that, "[T]he life of the law has not been logic, it has
been experience." 19 3 In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
acknowledged the "logical coherence" and "internal consistency"
of the bifurcated "separate borrowing transaction" approach.19
However, she agreed with her colleagues that this approach
should not be a rule of law. 9" "We do not write on a slate
marked only by Crane,"'' 96 she stated, but rather on one marked
by numerous lower court decisions and by the Commissioner's
long standing and defensible position which collapses and amal-
gamates the purchase and loan aspects of the transaction.
In this context, Tufts is not a judicial chorus to the legisla-
tive concert in TEFRA and the Tax Reform Act. The rejection
of footnote thirty-seven is not a major setback for tax shelters
and other investments, but is rather a positive reaffirmation of
the general principles of taxation applicable to them."'
192. Id. at 79.
193. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Cf. "A page of history is worth a
volume of logic." N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
194. 461 U.S. at 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Rollyson, Service Turns
the Tables on the Crane Doctrine, 3 J. REAL EsT. TAX'N 495, 500-01 (1976).
195. 461 U.S. at 319 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
196. Id. See Yang, Tufts: Footnote to Crane, 62 TAXEs 118, 123-24 (1984).
197. See Sanders, supra note 4, at 5; Rice's Toyota World, Inc. v. Comm'r, 81 T.C.
at 184 n.9, afj'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds), 752 F.2d 89 (4th Cir.
1985); Recent Cases, Partnership Sales: When Nonrecourse Debt Exceeds Fair Market
Value, 17 AKnON L. REV. 155, 160 (1983). Contra Recent Decisions, 13 Cum. L. REv. 707,
729 (1984)("[t]he court's decision to elevate a nonrecourse loan to true loan status repre-
sents a clear expansion of Crane"); Rutgers Note, supra note 4, at 981 ("[t]he Tufts
decision resoundingly defeats one more tax shelter opportunity").
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